INDIVIDUAL ADVERSE POSSESSION IN IRREGULAR SUBDIVISIONS AND REURB

A PRAGMATIC-CONSEQUENTIALIST ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF LINDB AND LAW & ECONOMICS

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the perverse incentives created by the jurisprudence that allows individual adverse possession in irregular subdivisions, demonstrating how this practice harms the very beneficiaries it seeks to protect. The methodology employed consists of a pragmatic-consequentialist analysis, based on Law and Economics and the pragmatic turn promoted by the Law of Introduction to the Norms of Brazilian Law (LINDB). The results point to the identification of five categories of consequences ignored by judicial decisions, evidencing an incentive structure that rewards irregularity, relieves the subdivider of responsibility, and discourages collective regularization. It is concluded that Urban Land Regularization (REURB), established by Law Nº.13,465/2017, presents itself as the pragmatically superior path to isolated individual adverse possession, as it is the only instrument capable of integrating the legal, urbanistic, and registry dimensions, correcting the incentive structure and ensuring not only the property title, but the effective right to the city.